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Abstract
Compared to budget-balanced Sharing contracts, Anti-Sharing may
improve the eﬃciency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a ﬁxed pay-
ment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out
its value to them. If a team members becomes Anti-Sharer, he will be
unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield
the ﬁrst-best outcome. Anti-Sharing is more likely to yield a higher team
proﬁt than Sharing, the larger the team, the curvature of the production
function, or the marginal eﬀort cost. Sharing is more likely to be bet-
ter, the greater the marginal product, the cross-partials of the production
function, or the curvature of the eﬀort cost.
JEL-Code: D 23, L 23, C 72
Keywords: Budget-breaker, supermodularity, constrained eﬃciency.
1 Introduction
It is well established that budget-balanced sharing contracts do not motivate
risk-neutral team members to choose eﬃcient eﬀort.1 For risk-averse teams,
Rasmusen (1987) has shown that sharing contracts may implement ﬁrst-best
eﬀort. Strausz (1999) has proposed an eﬃcient sharing rule for sequential teams.
However, an optimal contract for teams of risk-neutral agents who choose their
non-veriﬁable eﬀort simultaneously has not yet been derived .
“Anti-Sharing” is an attempt to solve the sharing problem. Under an Anti-
Sharing contract, the team members have to make a ﬁxed payment to the Anti-
Sharer who, in turn, is obliged to pay the full team output to each member.
Hence, all team members except for the Anti-Sharer are residual claimants and
∗Corresponding author: Professorship for Business Economics, Otto-von-Guericke-
University, Bldg. 22/D-003, POBox 4120, 39016 Magdeburg, Germany. Email:
rol@rolandkirstein.de, phone +49-391-67-18729, fax -11764. Research on this paper started
while I enjoyed the hospitality of the University of California in Berkeley (School of Law)
and in Santa Barbara (Economics Department). Financial aid from the Thyssen Stiftung is
gratefully acknowledged. We are indebted to Oliver Fabel, Tim Friehe, Ron Heiner, Joachim
Henkel, Annette Kirstein, Stefan Kl¨ oßner, Volker Kr¨ atschmer, Mathias Kr¨ akel, Michael Ku-
nisch, Ian Langella, Dirk Matzner, Bernhard Neum¨ arker, Veronika Nolte, Dieter Schmidtchen,
Dirk Sliwka, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
∗∗Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law, 792 Simon Hall, School of Law, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley CA 94720-7200. Email: rcooter@law.berkeley.edu
1See the general proof in Holmstrom (1982). The ineﬃciency of relative performance
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1have stronger incentives to spend eﬀort than under a sharing contract. The role
of the Anti-Sharer may be played by an outsider or by one of the team-members.
External Anti-Sharing is closely related to “bonding”, as it was mentioned by
Holmstrom (1982, 328), and can induce ﬁrst-best eﬀorts.2
This paper focuses on internal Anti-Sharing, which leads to a theory of the
ﬁrm in the spirit of Alchian/Demsetz (1972). In their paper, one team mem-
ber becomes residual claimant and (perfectly) monitors the others to solve the
sharing problem. Anti-Sharing neither presupposes monitoring abilities, nor is
the resulting hierarchy based on authority. We set up a simple model with ho-
mogeneous agents and compare symmetric Sharing with internal Anti-Sharing.
As the internal Anti-Sharer remains unproductive in equilibrium, ﬁrst-best ef-
forts will not be reached. However, the team proﬁt can be higher than under a
sharing contract.
2 The model
2.1 Ineﬃciency of the Sharing Contract
Consider n risk-neutral agents who spend eﬀort ei ≥ 0,i = 1..n to produce an
output Y (e), where e = (e1..en) represents the eﬀort vector of all n players.3 The
production function Y (e) is twice diﬀerentiable, continuous, with positive but
diminishing marginal returns, and with non-negative cross-partials. Individual
eﬀorts are assumed to be non-veriﬁable. We denote the eﬀort disutility of agent i
as C(ei) and assume C1 > 0 < C11 as well as C(0) = 0 and C1(0) = 0.4 Players’
utility functions are separable in wealth and eﬀort cost. To keep the model
simple, we assume the agents to be homogeneous, i.e., they are identical with
regard to eﬀort costs, utility functions, and marginal productivity. Moreover,
for all agents the second derivatives and the cross-partials of the production
function are assumed to be identical.
The socially optimal eﬀort vector e∗ maximizes the team proﬁt T(e) = Y (e) − Pn
i=1 C(ei) and, thus, satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions5 Yi(e∗
(−i),ei)−C1(ei) =
0,i = 1..n. As Holmstrom (1982) has demonstrated, a budget-balanced “Shar-
ing” contract does not induce the players to choose e∗
i. Sharing is budget bal-
anced if the players’ shares, denoted as si ≥ 0, add up to 1. Under such a
contract, at least one player receives a share smaller than one. The incentives
are, thus, insuﬃcient at least for some players even if all other players choose
2However, external Anti-Sharing diﬀers from outside enforcement of non-balanced sharing.
3Let e(−i) denote the eﬀort vector of all n players except player i, i.e., (e1..ei−1,ei+1..en).
Consequently, e(−i,−j) is the eﬀort vector without the contributions of players i and j. For
convenience, we write e = (e(−i),ei) = (e(−i,−j),ei,ej).
4With regard to functions (in capital letters), the index i denotes the ﬁrst derivative with
respect to the ith argument, while an index ij denotes a second derivative with respect to the
ith and jth argument. With regard to variables (lower case letters), an index i denotes the
ith player. Subsequently, we use the superscript S to indicate the sharing contract, while AS
refers to internal Anti-Sharing.
5We assume the second-order conditions for a ﬁnite maximum to be satisﬁed, hence the
Hessian to be negative deﬁnite, which requires the cross partials to be not too great. This
implies the second-order conditions for the individual players’ maximization problems under
Sharing and Anti-Sharing to hold as well.
2eﬃciently. Let eS
i denote player i’s equilibrium eﬀort under the symmetric shar-
ing contract with equal shares, i.e., si = 1/n. Each player i = 1..n maximizes
his individual payoﬀ Y (eS
(−i),ei)/n−C(ei), and the ﬁrst-order condition for an
internal solution is Yi(eS
(−i),ei) = nC1(ei),i = 1..n. The individual payoﬀ in
equilibrium amounts to Y (eS)/n − C(eS
i ). Hence, for n > 1 the equilibrium
eﬀorts are suboptimal. Sharing not only induces each of the agents to choose
lower than eﬃcient eﬀort, this also reduces the marginal productivity of each
agent if cross-partials of the production function are positive, which further
reduces the agents’ motivation.
2.2 Internal Anti-Sharing
Without loss of generality, we assign the role of the internal Anti-Sharer to the
1st team member. Each of the other agents i = 2..n promises to pay an amount
pi ≥ 0 to him. All players choose their eﬀort, denoted as eAS
i . The actual
output is produced Y (eAS) and transferred to the Anti-Sharer. He pays out
its value to each of the other team members, net of pi. The Nash equilibrium
analysis starts with player 1.
Proposition 1: In equilibrium the internal Anti-Sharer chooses zero eﬀort.
Proof: The Anti-Sharer receives the lump sum payments pi from the other
players as well as the actual output; he has to pay out (n − 1) times the value




i=2 pi + Y (e1,eAS




The ﬁrst derivative with respect to e1 is (2 − n) · Y1(e1,eAS
(−1)) − C1(e1).
As n ≥ 2, this expression is negative, hence eAS
1 = 0. 
The intuition behind this result is the distortion of the Anti-Sharer’s incentives
to spend eﬀort. He receives the actual output once, but has to pay its value
(n − 1) times to the other team members. For n ≥ 2, his individual marginal
proﬁt from spending eﬀort is negative.
We denote as ˆ e(−1) the “constrained eﬃcient” eﬀorts of players i = 2..n







, and derive our second result.
Proposition 2: Under an internal Anti-Sharing contract, a Nash equilibrium
exists in which players i = 2..n choose constrained eﬃcient eﬀorts ˆ ei.
Proof: Under the condition e1 = 0, the ﬁrst-order conditions for con-
strained eﬃcient eﬀorts are Yi(0,e(−1,−i),ei) = C1(ei),i = 2..n. Antic-





(−1,−i),ei) − C(ei) − pi
i
. As pi is independent of ei, the ﬁrst-
order conditions are identical to those for constrained eﬃcient eﬀort. 
An arbitrage argument allows us to derive the side payments pi endogenously.
If, in the constrained eﬃcient equilibrium, the Anti-Sharer’s payoﬀ is greater,
each team member wants to become Anti-Sharer; if is is lower, then no one
wants to assume this role. Hence (2 − n)Y (ˆ e) + (n − 1)pi = Y (ˆ e) − pi − C(ˆ e).
3This implies pi = (n − 1)[Y (ˆ e) − C(ˆ ei)]/n. In this arbitrage-free equilibrium,
each team member i = 1..n earns [Y (ˆ e) − (n − 1)c(ˆ en)]/n.
2.3 Comparison of Sharing and Anti-Sharing
Anti-Sharing Pareto-dominates Sharing if it yields a greater team proﬁt T(e) =
Y (e) −
P
c(ei), because side-payments are allowed. We will use the properties
of best-response functions and iso-team-proﬁt curves to derive criteria for this
comparison.
If the cross-partials of the production function Y (e) are positive then the indi-
vidual payoﬀ functions of the n team members also exhibit positive cross-partials
(the only exception is the internal Anti-Sharer). The team members i = 2..n
play a symmetric supermodular game, which is also supermodular in the eﬀort
of the Anti-Sharer i = 1. We can therefore limit the following analysis to the
relation between the eﬀort choices of one representative player i = 2..n (which































The slope of a player’s best response function is positive if the cross-partials of
this player’s individual proﬁt function with the other player’s eﬀort is positive,6
hence if Yij > 0, because Yii−C11 < 0. Figures 1a and 1b show the best-response
function ei(e1) under the Sharing (respective left curve) and the Anti-Sharing
contract (respective right curve).
Under Sharing, player i’s individual best reply to 1 is never greater than under
Anti-Sharing: eAS
i (e1) ≥ eS
i (e1). The Nash equilibrium under Sharing is repre-
sented by eS
i (ei), i.e., the bold dot on the 45-degree-line. The slope of eS
i (e1) is
decreasing in n.7 Hence, the Nash equilibrium under Sharing is shifted towards
6See Vives (2005).
7As ﬁgures 1a, 1b show e1 on the vertical axis, a lower slope would mean that eS
i (e1)
becomes steeper.
4the origin if n is increased. The best-response function of the Anti-Sharer, is
e1(ei) = 0. The Nash equilibrium under Anti-Sharing is represented by the
bold dot at eAS
i (0), while the ﬁxed point eAS
i (e1) = e1 represents the ﬁrst-best
outcome.
Figures 1a and 1b also show iso-team-proﬁt curves. Figure 1b depicts the case
in which Anti-Sharing yields a higher team proﬁt than Sharing, while ﬁgure 1a
displays an example in which Sharing is superior. Our next proposition derives
those properties of iso-team-proﬁt curves which are relevant for the comparison
between Sharing and Anti-Sharing.
Lemma: Any iso-proﬁt curve in an ei − e1−diagram (where ei represents the
symmetric eﬀort choice of players i = 2..n), when crossing the 45-degree line,
is strictly decreasing with slope −(n−1) and convex. It has a minimum (i.e, is
still convex) when crossing the best-response function eAS
i (e1).
Proof: Any iso-poﬁt curve can be expressed as an implicit function
T[e1(ei),ei] = t, where ei represents identical eﬀort choices of players i = 2..n,
while t denotes the proﬁt level under scrutiny. The slope of the iso-proﬁt curve








which proves the ﬁrst claim. Further diﬀerentiation of the total diﬀerential with




































With Tij > 0, the sign of this expression is ambiguous. However, on the 45-
degree line (with ei = e1) the assumption of symmetric agents implies Ti =
T1 > 0, Tii = T11 < 0, and Tij = Ti1 ≥ 0. In this case, the right hand side of
(2) can be simpliﬁed to
n − 1
Ti
[nTij − Tii − (n − 2)Tij − (n − 1)Tii] =
n − 1
Ti
[2Tij − nTii] > 0. (3)
This proves the convexity. To prove the last statement, recall that the slope
of the iso-team-proﬁt curve equals the slope of an iso-proﬁt curve of players
i = 2..n under the Anti-Sharing contract. Hence, the best-response function
eAS
i (e1) consists of unique minima of the iso-team-proﬁt curve. Thus, the latter
curves are strictly convex between the 45-degree-line and eAS
i (e1). 
Now we have completed the toolbox needed to compare the team outcomes
under the Sharing and Anti-Sharing. Sharing yields the higher team proﬁt if
the iso-team-proﬁt-curve has its minimum (on the best response function of
player i) at e1 > 0 (see ﬁgure 1a). Anti-Sharing yields the higher team payoﬀ if
5the Sharing iso-proﬁt line crosses the vertical axis to the left of eAS
i (0), as it is
displayed in ﬁgure 1b. As all the iso-team-proﬁt curves have slope −(n − 1) on
the 45-degree line, it only depends on their curvature which of these two cases is
true. The smaller the curvature, i.e., the smaller Tij or Ti or the greater Tii, the
more likely it is that the Anti-Sharing contract is the better one. Recall that
Ti = Yi − C1, Tii = Yii − C11, and Tij = Yij. These insights from the Lemma
establish our ﬁnal result.
Proposition 3: Anti-Sharing is more likely to be the superior contract, the
greater n, Yii, or C1, and the smaller Y1, Yij, or C11.
The results regarding n and Tij highlight the main intuition behind the com-
parison of the two team contracts. The ineﬃciency of the Sharing contract is
caused by the fact that all members face ineﬃciently low incentives. The Shar-
ing problem increases with a greater n. The ineﬃciency of Anti-Sharing is due
to the lack of player 1’s contribution, but this problem becomes less relevant the
greater the team. On the other hand, a higher cross-partial of the production
function may increase the ineﬃciency of Anti-Sharing. Look at the extreme case
of a Cobb-Douglas or Leontief production function: the best reply of all players
i to e1 = 0 would be eAS
i (0) = 0. Hence, complete substitution of the inputs is
a necessary condition (albeit not suﬃcient) for Anti-Sharing to yield a higher
team proﬁt than Sharing.
3 Discussion
We have demonstrated that internal Anti-Sharing can make a team better oﬀ,
compared to the symmetric sharing contract. However, as the internal Anti-
Sharer has no incentive to contribute positive eﬀort, this contract also fails to
achieve the ﬁrst-best solution; it can even be worse than Sharing. The convexity
of iso-team-proﬁt curves as well as the team size are the decisive factors for the
question which contract makes the team better oﬀ. In an asymmetric case,
the least productive partner should become Anti-Sharer. The productivity of
partner i, however, is not only to be measured by his own marginal productivity,
but also by his impact on the other players via the cross-partials.
It is worth discussing a modiﬁcation of the Anti-Sharing contract: let the pro-
ductive agent pay a higher ﬁxed payment to the Anti-Sharer who, in turn, pays
more than the actual output to the productive team members. This would in-
duce the latter to spend even more eﬀort, which might make up for the lack of
eﬀort on the Anti-Sharer’s side. However, we have shown that the Anti-Sharer
contract as described above is indeed “constrained eﬃcient”, i.e., it maximizes
the team proﬁt under the condition e1 = 0. In this paper, we have only compared
Sharing and Anti-Sharing, and disregarded other contract structures which may
perform better than both of these. Hence, a general theory of second-best team
contracts still needs to be developed.
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